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RULEMAKING

UNDER DODD-FRANK:

PUTTING THE "PERSON" BACK INTO THE CONSUMER
LENDING PROCESS

ELIZABETH R. SCHILTZ

INTRODUCTION

The global financial crisis, triggered by the collapse of the U.S.
mortgage market in 2008, posed a challenging paradox:

.

"There is no question that [ it was] a global financial crisis. . . . The
collapse of the real estate bubble [in the U.S.] exposed the degree of
interconnectedness among financial institutions across the globe
created by the worldwide market for the derivate investment
products created on the backs of the underlying real estate loansthe mortgage-backed securities in all their complex manifestations,
and the credit default swaps that were essentially insurance policies
on the risks of default of these securities. . .
[At the same time, though, a]t its root, the . . . crisis is in a very
important sense fundamentally a uniquely local phenomenon. It is
the result of individual consumer transactions that are about as
inherently local as a commercial transaction can ever get-loans to
specific individual consumers tied to specific unique, unmovable
pieces of residential real estate. Every single loan packaged into the
bundles of investment opportunities that became "toxic assets" held
by large institutional investors originated with a contractual
relationship between an individual borrower and a single lender. In
addition to the global macroeconomic consequences of the collapse
of this market, every one of these loans that goes into default has
personal consequences for the individual borrower whose home is
the collateral for that loan.1

1. Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Paradox of the Global and the Local in the Financial Crisis of
2008: Applying the Lessons of Caritas in Veritate to the Regulation of Consumer Credit in the
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This paradox raises practical questions about the "architecture" of the
appropriate legal and regulatory responses to the crises:
Does the scope of the problem demand the efficiencies of broadbrush, national (or even global) standards governing such activity,
or does the origin of the problem in individual consumer
transactions require more differentiated, individualized local
responses? Or is some combination of the two approaches the most
effective way to prevent future global economic meltdowns?2
In addition to this practical geographical challenge of locating the
proper legal jurisdiction to effectively address the problem; this paradox
exposes a relational challenge. In structuring a regulatory response to the
crisis, what is the proper weight to be given to the interests of the various
parties to the relationships created in the consumer lending process: the
consumer, the lender, and the entities that acquire interests in the credit
transaction between the consumer and lender (the institutions that securitize
the loans, assign credit ratings to the securities, and buy the resulting pieces
of the securitized loans)? This question lies at the heart of identifying the
proper regulatory response to the global financial crisis.
The global financial crisis has evoked strong responses from world
religious leaders, including forceful statements from Popes Benedict XVI
and Francis.3 All of these messages share an insistence on the centrality of
the human person as the appropriate focus of market mechanisms, and
skepticism about the exclusive focus on efficiency-the lodestar of
market economies-as the ultimate goal of economic regulation. The DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 20104 ("DoddFrank"), in many respects, addresses these same concerns. One of DoddFrank's major innovations was the creation of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau ("CFPB"), a federal agency with the specific mandate of

United States and the European Union, 26 J. OF LAW & RELIGION 173, 173-74 (2010) (citations
omitted).
2. Id. at 174-75.
3. This Article will focus on the writings of Pope Benedict XVI and Pope Francis. Many
world religious leaders have affirmed these writings. See, e.g., Doing The Truth In Love: An
Evangelical Call for Response to Caritas In Veritate, FIRST THINGS, Aug. 18, 2009,
http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2009/08/doing-the-truth-in-love58-an-evangelical-callfor-response-to-caritas-in-veritate (last visited Jan. 20, 2014) (statement of 68 Evangelical
Protestant community leaders from the U.S., Canada, England, the Netherlands, Sri Lanka, and
New Zealand).
4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of predominately 12 & 15 U.S.C.).
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protecting the consumer, thus placing, at least for one agency, the "person"
at the center of regulatory deliberations. Further, Dodd-Frank's consumer
credit provisions establish significant new regulatory requirements at every
stage of the credit process, putting a giant brake on the consumer credit
"'machine"' through which the building blocks of individual consumer
loans are transformed into securitized credit instruments and effectively
rejecting "'efficiency"' as the primary measure of consumer credit
regulation. However, in practice, there have proven to be substantial limits
to Dodd-Frank's rejection of efficiency, and to the CFPB's ability to keep
"'the person"' at the center of consumer credit regulation. The most
common challenges to Dodd-Frank's regulatory measures are that they
render the American banking system uncompetitive with respect to other,
less-regulated jurisdictions, and that they are inefficient-the very defenses
that Popes Benedict and Francis allege contributed to the financial collapse
that Dodd-Frank was enacted to address.
In Part I of this Article, I will first summarize the arguments of Popes
Benedict and Francis for a reorientation of economic analysis to recover a
focus on the "'person"' in an economic transaction. I will then put these
arguments into context, showing their relationship to other, non-religious
critiques of the regulatory system in the wake of the global financial
collapse. In Part II, I will first describe how the creation of the CFPB and
the regulatory authority bestowed on it by Dodd-Frank could be seen as
providing a possible structural mechanism for facilitating such a renewed
focus on the person. Then, I will consider the limits to this refocus that are
built into this structural mechanism. I will conclude with a preliminary
assessment of how successful the CFPB is likely to be as an unlikely
instrument of the Church's proposals for global financial reform.

I.

COMMON THEMES IN RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR REACTIONS TO THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS

A. Popes Benedict and Francison FinancialReform
1. The RelationalHuman Person as the ProperFocus of Market
Activity
In his 2009 encyclical Caritas in veritate,s ("Caritas") Pope Benedict
XVI responded to the exploding financial crisis by arguing that the two
principles in the encyclical's title-charity and truth-must be

5.

Pope Benedict XVI, Encyclical Letter Caritas in veritate (2009) [hereinafter Caritas].
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inextricably linked together in every aspect of our common lives togetherour common vocation to an authentically human "economic, social, and
political development." 6 This includes the market. Benedict noted that a
properly functioning market can operate as "the economic institution that
permits encounter between persons, inasmuch as they are economic
subjects who make use of contracts to regulate their relations as they
exchange goods and services of equivalent value between them, in order to
satisfy their needs and desires."' However,
if the market is governed solely by the principle of the equivalence
in value of exchanged goods, it cannot produce the social cohesion
that it requires in order to function well. Without internalforms of
solidarity and mutual trust, the market cannot completely fulfill its
proper economic function. And today it is this trust which has
ceased to exist, and the loss of trust is a grave loss.'
Infusing the market with the principle of gratuitousness and the logic of
gift is, Pope Benedict claimed, "[t]he great challenge before us, accentuated
by the problems of development in this global era and made even more
urgent by the economic and financial crisis."' He challenged us to
... demonstrate, in thinking and behavior, not only that traditional
principles of social ethics like transparency, honesty and
responsibility cannot be ignored or attenuated, but also that in
commercial relationships the principle of gratuitousness and the
logic of gift as an expression of fraternity can and must find their
place within normal economic activity. This is a human demand at
the present time, but it is also demanded by economic logic. It is a
demand both of charity and of truth. 10

The concepts of "gratuitousness" and the "logic of gift" are complex
ideas whose full explication is well beyond the scope of this article.
However, many commentators begin unpacking these ideas with the basic
insight that Benedict's critic of the economic system is fundamentally an
anthropological critic. Much of modern economic theory rests on
assumptions about human behavior that are not justified. Most significantly

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.¶ 34.
Id.¶ 35.
Id.
Id.¶ 36.
Id.
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for Benedict's critique, in the words of theologian Kenneth Himes," the
imago Dei that all humans reflect is a "Trinitarian communion of divine
persons." Humans, thus, are inherently social and relational, and human
development is necessarily relational: "To ignore the importance of social
relationships, the common good, and solidarity for the sake of maximizing
profits is to misinterpret the meaning of human development by
overlooking the essential relatedness of the person."1 2 Theologian Miguel
Diaz (who served as U.S. Ambassador to the Holy See from 2009 to 201213)
notes that Caritas
contains a rich reflection on "what has become a central category of
contemporary philosophical and theological reflection: the category
of relation. Rejecting isolation, the encyclical embraces relationship
to others and interdependence as essential to what it means to be
human, and as the signpost for envisioning just and truth-filled
economic initiatives. . . . [T]he encyclical's arguments reflect
ongoing Roman Catholic concerns to affirm the relational nature of
human and other creaturely existence and to reconcile individual
and communal identity. "14
Economist Stefano Zamagni understands Caritas' stress on reciprocity
as:
"a call to overcome the now-outdated dichotomy between the
economic and social spheres. Modernity has left us as a legacy the
idea that access to the economy requires setting profit as the main
goal and being moved by self-interest, which is the same as saying
that one cannot be a true entrepreneur if one does not pursue profit
maximization. This absurd idea derives from the theoretical error
that confuses the market economy, a genus, with one of its
particular species, namely capitalism. This error, in turn, has led us
to erroneously identify the economy as the place where wealth (or
income) is produced and the social sphere as the place where

11.

Kevin Himes, Benedict's View of the Person, in THE MORAL DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC

LIFE: AN EXTENSION AND CRITIQUE OF CARITAS IN VERITATE 31, 32 (Daniel K. Finn ed., 2012)
[hereinafter "MORAL DYNAMICS"].""

12. Id.
13.
155 Cong. Rec. S8783 (Aug. 4, 2009); See also Univ. ofDayton, MIGUEL DiAZ,
http://www.udayton.edu/directory/artssciences/universityprofessor faith justice/diaz miguel.ph
p (last visited Feb. 27, 2014).
14.

Miguel H. Diaz, Theological Foundations of Human Relation, in MORAL DYNAMICS,

supra note 11, at 62-63.
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wealth is distributed and solidarity is found.""
Caritas calls for us to envisage the market as a sphere where the
principle of reciprocity has as strong a claim as a proper measure of
transactions as the principle of exchange. Allowing the principle of
reciprocity to permeate the market, as well as our social relations, corrects
the mistaken anthropology that underlies the current economy: it restores
the centrality of the human person to market calculations, and
acknowledges the relationality of human nature.
1. Rejecting Efficiency as Predominant Value, in Favor of Focus on
the Person
One consistent thread in Caritas that follows from all of the above is
the rejection of the market's lodestar, "efficiency" as the sole, or even
predominant, value to govern economic analysis. It is efficiency arguments
that have been the predominant drivers in the globalization of credit that led
to the financial collapse. In the U.S., the decreased local authority over
consumer credit regulation that led to its essential deregulation historically
was justified by the need to provide a more efficient market for consumer
financial products. Eliminating variations in the regulation of credit at the
local level allowed nationally chartered banks to offer uniform products to
consumers across the U.S. efficiently. Regulatory barriers were eliminated
based largely on the argument that consumers' interests are best served by
having access to a multiplicity of such products offered at the lower rates
that the operational efficiencies produce.1 6
Benedict does not reject efficiency arguments out of hand. He
acknowledges that the efficiencies engendered by the globalization of the
world's economies have "been the principal driving force behind the
emergence from underdevelopment of whole regions, and in itself it
represents a great opportunity."1 As the theologian Douglas Farrow points
out, Benedict insists that "[g]lobalization ... is something more than the
inevitable consequence of technology. In fact, it tells us something about
the way humanity is made. Globalization, in other words, is a consequence
of divine design."" This appreciation for the potential benefits of

15.

Stefano Zamagni, Reciprocity and Fraternity, in MORAL DYNAMICS, supra note 11, at

16.

See Schiltz, supra note 1, at 201-04. See also Gill North & Ross P. Buckley, The Dodd-

74.
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer ProtectionAct: UnresolvedIssues ofRegulatory Culture

and Mindset, 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 479 (2011).
17.
Caritas,supra note 5, ¶ 33.
18.

Douglas Farrow, Charity and Unity, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 2009, at 37-38.

No. 2]

Rulemaking under Dodd-Frank

123

globalization is shared by many who likewise condemn its excesses. 1 9
"Nevertheless," Benedict cautions in Caritas, "without the guidance of
charity in truth, this global force could cause unprecedented damage and
create new divisions within the human family."2 0 Indeed, Benedict
insightfully applies the analysis of the danger of the technological
imperative to the efficiency arguments like those made to facilitate the
globalization of credit. He writes:
Often the development of peoples is considered a matter offinancial
engineering, the freeing up of markets, the removal of tariffs,
investment in production, and institutional reforms-in other
words, a purely technical matter. All these factors are of great
importance, but we have to ask why technical choices made thus far
have yielded rather mixed results. We need to think hard about the
cause. Development will never be fully guaranteed through
automatic or impersonal forces, whether they derive from the
markets or from international politics. Development is impossible
without upright men and women, without financiers andpoliticians
whose consciences are finely attuned to the requirements of the
common good. Both professional competence and moral
consistency are necessary. When technology is allowed to take
over, the result is confusion between ends and means, such that the
sole criterion for action in business is thought to be the
maximization of profit, in politics the consolidation of power, and
in science the findings of research. Often, underneath the intricacies
of economic, financial and political interconnections, there remain
misunderstandings, hardships and injustice. The flow of
technological know-how increases, but it is those in possession of it
who benefit, while the situation on the ground for the peoples who
live in its shadow remains unchanged: for them there is little chance
of emancipation.21
Theologian and economist Albino Barrera develops this analogy, with a
historical reference to the industrial revolution. He explains:
Contemporary globalization actually entails two separate but
complementary phenomena: global economic integration and the

19.
20.
21.

ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION 23 (2008).
Caritas, supra note 5, ¶ 33.

Id.¶71.

124 UNIV. OF ST THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. VIII

emergence of the knowledge economy. In the same way that cheap
cotton cloth, cheap iron and steel, cheap steam power and
electricity, and cheap oil gave rise to the modern industrial
economy of the last three centuries, so today cheap information is
radically altering the way we work, consume, live, and interact with
one another. This emerging globalized "knowledge economy" will
be as historic and transformative for the postindustrial era as the
Industrial Revolution was in shaping modernity centuries ago.
Epochal economic shifts are usually accompanied by changes in the
public's market ethos. People's perception of what is right or wrong
and what is fair or unfair adjusts in the wake of the damaging
effects of paradigm shifts. For example, in response to the abuses
during the early phases of the Industrial Revolution, nineteenthcentury British social legislation imposed a minimum age for
employment, maximum hours and days of work, and workplace
safety regulations. These norms eventually became standard for
most countries in the twentieth century. Today, we are in the midst
of a similar adjustment in market morality.
The market is playing an increasingly central role in shaping and
implementing public policy .... The market can be a wonderful
instrument encouraging creativity and constructive technological
change-and it has been a big part of the rise of many nations out
of the depths of subsistence agriculture. But the market has also
seeped into many facets of our common and private lives (e.g.,
commercial surrogacy). Left on its own with minimal oversight
from the community, the marketplace will impose its own ethos.
Since it is focused principally on allocative efficiency, the
neoclassical market takes little note of the unintended consequences
it spawns, such as materialism, consumerism, impersonalism, and
individualism. Unsuspecting market participants will find
themselves either internalizing these values by default or reluctantly
conforming to them for their own economic survival. Market
models and rules bring with them a market mentality, that is, a
market-generated morality." 22
2. Pope Francis'Emphasis on the Person
Pope Francis' statements on this topic have been consistent with those

22.

Albino Barrera, Global Economic Forces, in MORAL DYNAMICS, supra note 11, at 22.
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of Pope Benedict described above, albeit clearly intended more for their
rhetorical impact than their intellectual suasion. Among Pope Francis' first
public pronouncements was an address to new ambassadors of Kyrgyzstan,
Antigua and Barbuda, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and Botswana on
May 16, 2013, in which he first articulated words that eventually found
their way into his recent Apostolic Exhortation, Evangeii Gaudium
("Gaudium"):
The current financial crisis can make us overlook the fact that it
originated in a profound human crisis: the denial of the primacy of
the human person! We have created new idols. The worship of the
ancient golden calf . .. has returned in a new and ruthless guise in
the idolatry of money and the dictatorship of an impersonal
economy lacking a truly human purpose. The worldwide crisis
affecting finance and the economy lays bare their imbalances and,
above all, their lack of real concern for human beings; man is
reduced to one of his needs alone: consumption.2 3
Even more strongly than Pope Benedict, Pope Francis argues that the
mechanism of the free market cannot, on its own, retrieve the needed focus
on the person. He writes:
Some people continue to defend trickle-down theories which
assume that economic growth, encouraged by a free market, will
inevitably succeed in bringing about greater justice and
inclusiveness in the world. This opinion, which has never been
confirmed by the facts, expresses a crude and naive trust in the
goodness of those wielding economic power and in the sacralized
workings of the prevailing economic system.2 4
He argues that the growing gap between the majority poor and "the
prosperity enjoyed by those happy few" results from
ideologies which defend the absolute autonomy of the marketplace
and financial speculation. Consequently, they reject the right of

23. Pope Francis, Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Gaudium ¶ 55 (2013) [hereinafter
Gaudium].; See also Francis' Address to New Ambassadors (May 16, 2013), available at
http://www.zenit.org/en/articles/francis-address-to-new-ambassadors (last visited Jan. 20, 2014)
(address to new ambassadors to the Holy See).
24. Id. T 54.
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states, charged with vigilance for the common good, to exercise any
form of control. A new tyranny is thus born, invisible and often
virtual, which unilaterally and relentlessly imposes its own laws
and rules.... In this system, which tends to devour everything
which stands in the way of increased profits, whatever is fragile,
like the environment, is defenseless before the interests of a deified
market, which become the only rule.2 5
He challenges political and financial leaders: "I exhort you to generous
solidarity and to the return of economics and finance to an ethical approach
which favors human beings,"2 6 keeping in mind that "[t]he dignity of each
human person and the pursuit of the common good are concerns which
ought to shape all economic policies."27
B. Putting the Popes'Arguments in Context
The theological language in which Popes Benedict and Francis couch
their critiques should not obscure the fact that their analysis of the problems
leading to the global financial crisis is consistent with arguments made by
many commentators approaching the topic from secular viewpoints. Let us
now examine some of these arguments that focus on three different actors
in the drama of the financial crisis: the consumers, the regulators, and the
bankers.
1. The Consumers: The Anthropological Critique of the Behavioral
Economists
One analysis of the global financial crisis that also stresses the need for
a renewed focus on the human person is that of the behavioral economists.
Legal scholar Dee Pridgen describes how behavioral economics has, in fact,
begun to effect what she calls a "sea-change" in consumer protection law
over the past few years; the enactment of Dodd-Frank and creation of the
CFPB are the most dramatic manifestations of a fundamental change in the
underlying theory of consumer protection.2 8 She argues that the first wave
of federal consumer protection laws enacted in the late 1960s and early
1970s (the Consumer Credit Protection Act2 9 , and most significantly the

25.
26.
27.
28.
Stronger
29.

Id.¶ 56.
Id.¶ 58.
Id. T 203.
Dee Pridgen, Sea Changes in Consumer Financial Protection: Stronger Agency and
Laws, 13 WYO. L. REV. 405, 405 (2013).
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1693r (West 2014).
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section of that act known as the Truth in Lending Act3 0 ), were primarily
disclosure laws.3 1 They were based on the theory that clear, uniform
disclosure of the terms of each credit transaction would enable consumers
to make rational choices about their credit. As Pridgen explains:
It was presumed that if the law provided consumers with
standardized information about the comparative costs of competing
credit products, then the competitive marketplace would be able to
function to maximize consumer welfare. This is known as rational
choice theory, premised on the existence of "homo economicus," a
rational consumer choice maker, who by making rational choices
based on individual preferences, will lead to the best economic
outcome for the market as a whole. Based on this theory, much of
consumer credit law took a pure disclosure approach to consumer
protection in which consumers were given relevant information
about competing credit products, and were expected to choose the
one that maximized their welfare. Disclosure of information was
viewed as a panacea for imperfections in the market for consumer
credit, because in theory, disclosures of information alone could
protect consumers and promote competition while imposing the
least cost on the market and meeting with the least amount of
political resistance.3 2
In contrast, Dodd-Frank and the other significant piece of federal
consumer protection legislation of recent years, the Credit CARD Act of
2009,33 go beyond mandating disclosure to imposing substantive restrictions
on credit practices. Pridgen contends that the impetus for this new approach
to consumer credit regulation stems from the work of behavioral economics
scholars, who
questioned the premise that consumers would always act rationally
in their own self-interest if presented with adequate information.
Basically, these scholars concluded that rational choice theory does
not accurately describe how consumers actually behave in the
marketplace. Behavioral economics scholars focused on certain
cognitive barriers that prevent most consumers from choosing

30.
31.
32.
33.
24, 123

15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1665e (West 2014).
Pridgen, supra note 28, 416-17.
Id.
Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111Stat. 1734 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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rationally, and also revealed that markets of credit products may
have actually exploited these flaws in consumer decision-making
for their own benefit.3 4
Pridgen argues that the failure of the disclosure regime to prevent the
global financial crisis can be understood in light of the insights of
behavioral economics. Why did so many consumers ignore information
provided in the federally-mandated disclosures that ought to have warned
them that the expiration of low interest rates on balloon mortgages and
significant pre-payment penalties would lock them into mortgages they
could not afford to sustain? Behavioral economics posits a number of
explanations. Information about higher interest rates after the initial lowrate period can be ignored by consumers facing "information overload,"
who tend to focus instead on the most immediate features, such as closing
costs and initial monthly payments, 35 and by consumers whose natural
inclination is to be overly optimistic about the future. 36 Two of the
explanations offered by behavioral economists focus on particular aspects
of consumers' relationships with the credit providers. Pridgen cites
scholarship arguing that "borrowers who feel insecure about their
creditworthiness may be overly trusting of a broker or lender representative,
even if what the broker/lender says is contradicted by written disclosures." 37
Also, the "endowment effect" can cause a home-buyer to feel as though
they already own the home they are engaged in buying, and can make them
reluctant to unwind a complex transaction already commenced with a host
of other people.3 8
In essence, similar to Popes Benedict and Francis, the behavioral
economists are also lodging an anthropological critique of modern
economic theory, to explain the global financial crisis and shape the proper

34. Pridgen, supra note 28, at 417 (citing Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of
Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749 (2008); Edward L. Rubin, Rational Choice and Rat
Choice: Some Thoughts on the RelationshipAmong Rationality Markets, and Human Beings, 80
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1091 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 249 (2006); Alan M. White, Behavior and Contract, 27 LAW & INEQ. 135 (2009)).
35. Id. at 418 (citing Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of PredatoryLending, 38
AKRON L. REV. 725 (2005); Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmakingand the Limits of Disclosure: The
Problem ofPredatoryLending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 768 (2006)).
36. Id. at 419 (citing Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime
Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073 (2009)).
37. Id. at 418 (citing Jessica M. Choplin et al., A PsychologicalInvestigation of Consumer
Vulnerability to Fraud: Legal and Policy Implications, 35 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 61 (2011);
Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing ContractualMyths
Despite ConsumerPsychologicalRealities, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 617 (2009)).
38. Id. at 418-19 (citing Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: The Problem ofMarket Manipulation,74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 734 (1999)).
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regulatory response to the crisis. Instead of regulations based on the
fictional "rational economic actor," the behavioral economists are arguing
that we should examine the real human being, including the reality of the
relational nature of human interactions, and shape regulations based on this
insight. Thus, even Pridgen's title for this section of her article, From
"Homo Economicus" to Real Consumers, echoes Popes Benedict and
Francis' appeal for a refocus of economic theory to the "human person."3 9
Of course, the field of behavioral economics, as well as the scope and
wisdom of proposed specific applications of its conclusions, are subject to
critique,4 0 and a defense of the field is beyond the scope of this article. For
our purposes, though, it is clear that a major theoretical justification for the
regulatory approach of the CFPB relies on a renewed focus on the "person"
who is the subject of every consumer transaction.
2. The Regulators:Asleep at the Switch?
Some commentators on global financial crises place the primary blame
not on deficient regulatory schemes, but rather on financial regulators who
were "asleep at the switch."4 1 Richard Posner, for example, argues that the
Federal Reserve Board and other banking regulators in the United States did
have the regulatory authority to prevent financial institutions from making
the sorts of loans that eventually led to credit collapse even before the
enactment of Dodd-Frank, but that they failed to exercise it.4 2 Some of the
explanations for this failure focus on the venality of the people who were
rotating through the revolving doors between the highest echelons of the
regulatory agencies and the highest echelons of the regulated financial
institutions,4 3 and of the lobbyists and politicians who respond to the
massive amounts of money spent by the financial services industry to
influence regulatory actions.4 4
It is notable that the Popes' writings do not focus on topics such as
greed and venality. Instead, they focus on a more benign-if no less
dangerous-explanation: a misguided faith in the mechanisms of the

39. Id. at 416.
40. Pridgen, supra note 28, at 430-31 (and sources cited therein). See also Joshua D. Wright
& Eric Helland, The Dramatic Rise of Consumer Protection Law, in THE AMERICAN ILLNESS:
ESSAYS ON THE RULE OF LAW 316, 363 (2013) (criticizing behaviorist theory and its application
to the financial crisis).
41. Richard Posner, Financial Regulatory Reform: The Politics of Denial, 6 THE
ECONOMISTS' VOICE, no. 11, 2009, at 2.
42. Id.
43. Id.; Jagdish Bhagwati, Feeble Critiques: Capitalism's Petty Detractors, 172 WORLD
AFFAIRS 36, 42 (2009).; See also the Oscar-award winning documentary, THE INSIDE JOB (Sony
Picture Classics 2010).
44.
Bhagwati, supra note 43,at 42-43.
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market. This more benign explanation is explored by many commentators,
including legal scholars Gill North and Ross Buckley.4 5 North and Buckley
note that the Congress granted the Federal Reserve Board statutory
authority to address and regulate abuses in the mortgage lending market as
early as 1994, with the enactment of the Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act of 1994 ("H"OEPA").46 But the Federal Reserve exercised
this authority lightly, emphasizing additional consumer education
campaigns and making negligible regulatory changes, until 2008.46 North
and Buckley contend that the Fed's reluctance to react more forcefully to
mounting evidence of abusive home lending practices
was consistent with the well-established global patterns of increasing
deregulation and a strong reliance on markets-a fundamental belief in the
ability of markets to deal with themselves, a view that regulatory
interference in markets should be kept to a minimum, an emphasis on
efficiency or economic factors, and a belief that consumers should act
rationally and look after their own interests. 47 The actions of the Fed were
also consistent with the long-standing policy in the U.S. to encourage
people to own their own homes. 48 Based on these worldviews, the
governors of the Fed saw the growth in the subprime market as a natural
and positive development that was allowing millions of people to own their
own homes. 4 9 They were therefore reluctant to interfere; even though they
acknowledged that abuses were occurring, they determined that the greater
economic good or the net societal benefit was served by allowing the
lending to continue.o As late as May 2007, Chairman Bernanke indicated
that
we believe that the effect of the troubles in the subprime sector on
the broader housing market will likely be limited, and we do not
expect significant spillovers from the subprime market to the rest of
the economy or to the financial system ...
Credit market innovations have expanded opportunities for many
households. Markets can overshoot, but ultimately, market forces
also work to rein in excesses. For some, the self-correcting pullback
may seem too late and too severe. But I believe that, in the long
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run, markets are better than regulators at allocating credit."
North and Buckley argue that this irrational faith in the mechanisms of
the market suggests that "regulators need to radically change the framework
used to assess the net societal effects of the financial policy they
administer."5 2 In essence, they would fault Bernanke for failing to properly
value the human and social cost of the lateness and severity of the market's
"self-correcting pullback."
Those asserting this category of analysis of the current crisis are not
typically advocating a complete rejection of the free market. Indeed, this
analysis is often lodged as an argument against the robust interventionism
of Dodd-Frank.5 3 If the problem is not in the lack of robust regulation, but
rather the will of the regulators overseeing the regulation, we do not need
stronger laws, but rather better regulators. How do we improve the
regulators? By widening their focus to recognize that the mechanisms of the
free market are not always going to be sufficient to address all of the
collateral effects of economic decisions on society. In Zamagni's words, to
reject the error of identifying "the economy as the place where wealth (or
income) is produced and the social sphere as the place where wealth is
distributed and solidarity is found."5 4 Or, as Barrera suggested, to address
the failure of the "neoclassical market . . . [to] take . . . note of the
unintended consequences it spawns, such as materialism, consumerism,
impersonalism, and individualism."" Or, in Pope Francis' words, to reject
the "absolute autonomy of the market," and to keep in mind that "[t]he
dignity of each human person and the pursuit of the common good are
concerns which ought to shape all economic policies."5 6
Again, nailing down the details of exactly how the regulators and
financial professionals should incorporate considerations about the personal
and social effects of economic decisions in their work and in the
administration of our consumer protection laws is a vast topic beyond the
scope of this article. But for our purposes, it is significant to note the
similarities between the papal and secular analyses of the global financial
crisis, and the call for a change in regulatory culture or mindset to address
it.
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3. The Bankers: Hobbled Virtues
Many commentators have focused on the role of the banks making
subprime loans to consumers who were doomed to default, while the banks
isolated themselves from the risks of default by securitizing the loans and
selling them in increasingly complex variations of collateralized debt
obligations and derivative securities. This has transformed the banking
industry "from a relationship business to a transactional business and from a
customer to a counterparty business model."5 7 The banker's focus is no
longer on the soundness of the front-end transaction of the person who is
acquiring a home, but rather the profit to be made in selling that loan to
another institution. The possible "'cost"' of the default is not a concern of
the bank, since the bank will not bear that cost; the consumer bears that cost
alone. Again, as with the regulators, some commentators focus on the
venality of the bankers, the "Wolves of Wall Street,"" whose financial
incentives were based largely on the numbers of loans generated,
securitized, and sold to investors.5 9 Others, however, offer a more nuanced
analysis of the culpability of the bankers.
One of the most interesting is that of Dutch economists and
philosophers Johan Graafland and Bert W. van de Ven.6 0 They argue that
bankers are prevented from exercising virtues that they themselves consider
essential to their mission of banking by the constraints of the free market
system. Graafland and van de Ven analyzed the mission statements of eight
of the world's largest banks, including ones hit heavily by the financial
crisis, such as Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. They
concluded that the essential mission of the profession of bankers (in
contrast to the general mission of all corporations of maximizing
shareholder value) is "to serve the interests of customers by providing them
with relevant financial products at competitive prices."6 1 From a review of
the codes of conducts of these banks, Graafland and van de Ven then
extracted the following three core virtues considered essential to
accomplishing these missions: honesty, due care, and accuracy.6 2 Honesty
and integrity are identified by Goldman Sachs as being "at the heart of our
business," and by Deutsche Bank and ING as being essential in gaining the

57. Paul L. Lee, Heightened Compliance Risk Inherent to Modern Banking, AM. BANKER,
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59. Johan Graafland & Bert W. van de Ven, The Credit Crisis and the Moral Responsibility
of Professionals in Finance 12 (European Banking Center, Discussion Paper No. 2011-012,
2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1809752.
60. See id.
61. Id. at 5.
62. Id. at 7-8.
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care"' is described by

"providing those financial services considered best and most
appropriate by our clients, ensuring the continuity of those services,
with a view to the long-term interests of the client and by
demonstrating our commitment to our clients and their
environment, in ways that help them achieve both their personal,
social, and economic ambitions."64
Graafland and van de Ven point out that this virtue (in contrast to the
virtue of honesty),
argues that sellers and buyers often do not meet as equals and that
sellers that are in a more advantaged position have a duty to take
special care of the buyer's interest in the design of the product and
the instructions of how to use it. This is particularly relevant in the
case of financial products that typically cover a long period of time
(mortgages) and therefore involve complex inter-temporal
considerations most ordinary people are not well capable of
assessing. This means that a supplier is morally negligent when
others are harmed by a product in a way that the supplier could
possibly have foreseen or prevented.6 5
The third virtue identified by the banks in their codes of conduct is
accuracy and high quality of expertise provided. This entails an accurate
understanding of the products sold.Deutsche Bank claims: "As a German
global brand, a desire for accuracy, thoroughness and quality runs through
our organization. We understand issues in depth. This is why we keep
things simple and clear." 6 6 J.P. Morgan asserts, "To build a fortress balance
sheet, we must thoroughly understand all our assets and liabilities."6 7
Graafland and van de Ven then examine the actual behavior of banks
during and after the global financial crisis, and conclude, of course, that
bankers often did not exhibit the virtues outlined in their moral codes.6 8
Lack of honesty was sometimes evident in sales of risky investments to
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unsuspecting buyers.6 9 Lack of due care for the interests of customers was
evident in the aggressive sales of mortgage products with low teaser rates,
and in steering borrowers to products that yielded the highest incentives for
the bankers rather than most advantage to the customers. 0 The most
grievous failure according to Graafland and van de Ven, however, was the
failure to live up to the virtue of accuracy and professional expertise,
permitting the housing bubble to grow and burst with such disastrous
consequences:
In the case of the securitization business, there was not only a lack
of knowledge of the risks involved, but also a lack of motivation to
want to know that the securitization business was creating a bubble
of gigantic proportions. As long as the bubble was still growing,
many people benefited from inflating it further. No one appreciates
the whistleblower who spoils the party. The truth was simply too
inconvenient to dissuade those who continued to make huge profits
from continuing these lending practices. The ignorance of bankers,
therefore, can hardly count as an excuse. On the contrary, they
should have tried to learn more about the way their products were
designed, and what the inherent risks of these products were.7 1

&

Nevertheless, Graafland and van de Ven stress that it would be a
mistake to conclude that the credit crisis "stems from a lack of moral
strength on the part of banks and other financial market parties and the
individual professionals working in these sectors."7 2 Instead, they argue that
the structures of the largely unregulated market in which these bankers were
operating hampered their ability to exercise these virtues. They point to
Gillian Tett's study of bankers at J.P. Morgan, who were initially wary of
securitizing mortgages, because of their inability to accurately assess the
risks of these instruments.7 3 Eventually, however, this reluctance to share in
the profits being made by these instruments forced them to merge with
Chase, which was actively involved in this market. After the merger, only
the beginning of the collapse of this market prevented J.P. Morgan Chase
Co. from entering the market more aggressively. Graafland and van de Ven
write:
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Looking back we must conclude that banks like J.P. Morgan, with
its old-fashioned belief in the virtues of superior risk management,
were on the verge of becoming extinct. Old-school risk
management makes sense only if you believe that sooner or later
there is bound to be an end to the good times, or in other words that
the economy goes through a business cycle. Instead, financial
experts had come to believe that the risk-measurement models they
were using were so sophisticated that they would remove more
uncertainty than ever before. At the heart of this belief was the false
assumption that the markets would always be liquid enough to
allow any financial instrument to be bought or sold readily. 4
Graafland and van de Ven place this "crude and naYve trust in the ...
workings of the prevailing economic system"7 5 into the context of the
prevailing legal scheme shaped by this same trust, in which "[1]ack of
regulation ... offered banks the opportunity to provide mortgages to clients
with insufficient collateral or financial strength and to pass the credit risk
on to other market parties."76 Another element of the prevailing market
ideology that they fault is the assumption that "economic liberty is essential
in order to leave room for the unforeseeable and unpredictable." 7 7 This
valorization of innovation contributed to the lack of concern about the
complex financial products being created and sold without adequate
concern for, let alone understanding of, the risks that these products turned
out to pose to the world economic system. Economist Jagdish Bhagwati
ties these two dangers-the lack of regulation and the seductiveness of
innovation-together, observing that:
few on Wall Street caught up in the euphoria over these
...
financial innovations allowed for the reality of huge potential
downsides that should have required prudence and safeguards. All
economists and policymakers know about what Joseph Schumpeter
called the "creative destruction" of capitalism, but the invention of
these new financial instruments had a wholly different downside
possibility, one capable of bringing about what I have called ...
"destructive creation." This potential requires that innovation in the
financial sector be dealt with differently than other innovation. I

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 14.
Gaudium, supra note 23, ¶ 54.
Graafland & van de Ven, supra note 60 at 15.
Id. (referencing F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960)).

136 UNIV. OF ST THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. VIII

have therefore argued that we need an independent set of experts,
who are familiar with Wall Street but are not part of it (or of the
Wall Street-Treasury Complex), to evaluate the downside of new
instruments, and to make that informed analysis available to
regulators, who, after all, cannot regulate what they do not
understand. 8
In the end, Graafland and van de Ven conclude that an effective
response to the global financial crisis will require both an industry-wide
rededication of bankers to their identified virtues, and "complementary
institutional changes away from the Anglo-Saxon free market paradigm to a
more nuanced market view that acknowledges the need for regulation where
the risks of market imperfections harming overall welfare are simply too
high and too persistent."7 9
Again, assessing the validity of and figuring out how to implement
Graafland and van de Ven's propositions is beyond the scope of this article.
For our purposes, though, it is significant to recognize how many of their
themes are echoed in Pope Benedict's and Francis' critiques. The banker's
identified virtue of the "'duty of care"' recognizes the relational character
of the economic transactions that constitute the banker's business. The
recognition of the importance of the trust engendered by a longer-term
perspective of the banker's relationship with her customer evokes Pope
Benedict's call "that traditional principles of social ethics like transparency,
honesty and responsibility cannot be ignored or attenuated, but also that in
commercial relationships the principle of gratuitousness and the logic of
gift as an expression of fraternity can and must find their place within
normal economic activity."so Their concern for the failure of bankers to live
up to their identified virtue of "'accuracy"' with respect to overly complex
and innovative financial products echoes Pope Benedict's warning that:
"Development is impossible without upright men and women,
without financiers and politicians whose consciences are finely
attuned to the requirements of the common good. Both professional
competence and moral consistency are necessary. When technology
is allowed to take over, the result is confusion between ends and
means, such that the sole criterion for action in business is thought
to be the maximization of profit. . ."
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II. Do DODD-FRANK REFORMS OFFER A REALISTIC POSSIBILITY OF A
RENEWED FOCUS ON THE PERSON IN THE MACHINERY OF CONSUMER

CREDIT?

A. The Consumer ProtectionProvisions ofDodd-Frank
1. Creationof the CFPB
Dodd-Frank's major innovation with respect to consumer protection
was clearly the creation of the CFPB, a federal agency with the specific
mandate of looking out for the interests of the "'person"' at the end of every
consumer finance transaction. Prior to this, consumer protection regulations
were drafted and enforced by a panoply of agencies whose primary focus
and constituencies were the financial institutions at the other end of every
consumer finance transaction-the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the
National Credit Union Administration. Under Dodd-Frank, the consumer
protection functions of all of those agencies have been consolidated into the
CFPB, which has been given the power previously scattered among those
agencies (and the Federal Trade Commission) to draft regulations
implementing and to enforce the significant federal consumer financial
protection laws gathered under the umbrella of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act.8 2 The CFPB is charged with implementing and enforcing
"federal consumer financial law consistently for the purpose of ensuring
that all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products
and services and that markets for consumer financial products and services
are fair, transparent, and competitive. "83
The CFPB was also organized in ways that potentially give it much
more power than the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), which had been
the major federal consumer protection agency.8 4 In contrast to the FTC, the
CFPB is an "independent bureau" within the Federal Reserve System, and
is funded by revenues from the Federal Reserve." In this regard, its funding
puts it on an equal footing with the other federal banking agencies such as
the Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.8 6 in
contrast, the FTC is funded by annual congressional appropriations,
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subjecting it to more direct Congressional control.87 The CFPB is run by a
single director, appointed by the President (with the advice and consent of
the Senate) for a five-year term, in contrast to the FTC, which is run by five
commissioners, no more than three of which can be from any one political
party.8

The very existence of a structurally powerful governmental agency
whose charge aligns so closely with Pope Francis' call for consideration of
the dignity of each human person and pursuit of the common good in
shaping economic policies89 is a powerful force for keeping a focus on the
person in the sausage-making of the political process.
Even more
significant than these organizational features, though, are some of the
specific new regulatory powers that Dodd-Frank bestowed on the CFPB.
2. Substantive Prohibitionsin Dodd-Frank's Title XIV: Prohibitionson
Steering, andAbility to Pay Requirements.

Title XIV of Dodd-Frank has a telling subtitle: "The Mortgage Reform
and AntiPredatory Lending Act of 2010."9 It prohibits a number of
particular practices judged to be too predatory to be justified in residential
mortgage loans, such as excessive prepayment penalties,9 1 financing of
single premium credit insurance,92 and pre-dispute mandatory arbitration
provisions.93 Two additional provisions in Title XIV which have received
much attention can be viewed as, in essence forcing various participants in
the consumer credit process to consider the individual human being at the
other side of the loan agreement, and to practice the banking virtue
identified by Graafland and van de Ven as the "duty of care."94
The first is a set of restrictions on activities of mortgage brokers, the
companies that find lenders for consumers and help them negotiate terms. It
used to be quite common for brokers to get kick-backs from lenders, giving
brokers financial incentives to steer consumers to loans that might not be
best suited for them. Dodd-Frank now prohibits this practice.9 5 The
regulatory language promulgated by the CFPB reads:
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In connection with a consumer credit transaction secured by a
dwelling, a loan originator shall not direct or ""steer"" a consumer
to consummate a transaction based on the fact that the originator
will receive greater compensation from the creditor in that
transaction than in other transactions the originator offered or could
have offered to the consumer, unless the consummated transaction
is in the consumer's interest.9 6
The second is the requirement that lenders thoroughly document that
consumers to whom they extend residential mortgages do, in fact, have the
ability to repay those loans. No lender
"may make a residential mortgage loan unless the creditor makes a
reasonable and good faith determination based on verified and
documented information that, at the time the loan is consummated,
the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan, according
to its terms, and all applicable taxes, insurance (including mortgage
guarantee insurance), and assessments." 9 7
The statute sets out a "'safe-harbor'," giving banks a presumption of
ability to repay if the mortgage meets the definition of a "qualified
mortgage," that contains particular pro-consumer features.98
Clearly, both of these requirements impose on mortgage lenders a
hitherto absent legal requirement of a "'duty to care"' responsibility. At
some point in the lending process for a home mortgage, two significant
players-the mortgage broker and the mortgage lender-are legally forced
to consider the particularhuman being to whom a mortgage loan is being
made.
3. The Authority to Regulate "Unfair, Deceptive, and Abusive
Practices"
Since the enactment of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, the
primary standard governing most consumer protection (in both federal and
state laws) has been whether consumer practices were "unfair or
deceptive." 99 Dodd-Frank gave the CFPB the authority to regulate practices
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that are unfair, deceptive, or "abusive," without specifying the breadth or
content of that new power. Dodd-Frank defines an act or practice as
"'abusive"' if it:
(1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to
understand a term or condition of a consumer financial product or
service; or
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of-(A) a lack of understanding
on the part of the consumer of the material risks, costs, or
conditions of the product or service; (B) the inability of the
consumer to protect the interests of the consumer in selecting or
using a consumer financial product or services; or (C) the
reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person to act in
the interests of the consumer. 100
To date, the CFPB has exercised its authority to regulate unfair and
deceptive practices through enforcement actions and informal advisory
issuances' 01 rather than through formal rule-making,102 and has not offered
any specific guidance on the "'abusive"' feature of these practices. The
enforcement actions do, however, offer some flavor for the sorts of
behavior the CFPB may be intending to police through this power. The
most high-profile enforcement actions brought by the CFPB under this
authority to date have been actions against Capital One Financial 103 and
Discover Bank1 0 4 for deceptive marketing practices to pressure credit card
customers into buying add-on products, like payment protection and credit
monitoring, and against Cash America, a pay day lender for filing
inaccurate affidavits and filings in debt collection actions.105
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Commentators have suggested that it might be used to extend some of
the innovations of Title XIV to lending activity other than mortgage
lending. For example, legal scholar Mark Totten has suggested that it
might be used to address steering practices in student loans, where private
student lenders "fail[] to tell a student about the availability of moreadvantageous federal students loans for which the student might otherwise
qualify." 1 0 6
A fascinating glimpse into the possible signaling effect of UDAAP
enforcement was provided in a recent account of a conference of the
American Bankers Association's risk management forum. 107 The lawyers
offering bankers advice on how to protect their business from UDAAP
enforcement actions urged banks to try to recognize "what is fair, not just
what is legal". 10s One attorney advised that "part of successfully designing
UDAAP-compliant products comes down to the product's basic value.
Products that generate extraordinarily high margins are going to be a
killer.. .You don't want to be saying 'we make a lot of money on these
products' without being able to articulate why that's appropriate. "109
Another factor that these advisors urged banks to consider was suitability:
whether the product is well matched to a customer's needs. To
demonstrate a new product's value, . . . banks should carefully
document why a prospective product's utility makes it worth the
cost. That obligation is even greater for products that are sold to
"vulnerable" populations like the elderly or non-English speaking
customers.
"There ought to be documentation somewhere in your new product
program that focuses on the cost/benefit analysis [for consumers].
We're seeing that at some point, the bank is supposed to make the
choice for the customer. We're trying to protect customers from
themselves." 10
Moreover, according to these advisors, this responsibility for taking
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seriously the 'duty of care' did not end at the point of sale. 1
Simply because a product appears to offer a reasonable value for a
target audience doesn't mean that it's necessarily in the clear,
however. After a product hits the market, banks should look
carefully at whether the product is well understood and being used
as intended. If, for example, customers frequently incur fees that
were intended to be a deterrent, banks should reevaluate their
product's design. Complaints can also serve as a good tip-off that
the product is off the mark.1 1 2
Thus, even the threat of UDAAP enforcement is having the effect of at
least causing attorneys for financial institutions to advise banks to think
about the particular consumer to whom a loan is being made, and to take
into account particular vulnerabilities of some populations.

B. The StructuralMechanisms Placing Obstacles in the Way of a Keeping
a Focus on the Consumer
The enactment of Dodd-Frank was just the beginning of a multi-year
process of the implementation of Dodd-Frank through a whole host of
regulatory agencies. Dodd-Frank is a particularly "'inchoate"' piece of
legislation.1 1 3 Dodd-Frank contained approximately 400 directions to more
than 20 different regulatory agencies to issue regulations to flesh out the
details of its implementation.114 All federal regulations are subject to a
specific rule-making process."' First, the relevant agency drafts proposed
regulations. Next these proposed regulations are published for public
comment.1 16 Then these public comments must be processed by the
regulators; in connection with the processing, the regulators are required to
demonstrate that they have considered every substantive point raised in the
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public comments, and, in some cases, to undertake a cost-benefit analysis of
the proposed rule.1 17 After a regulation is finally promulgated, it is subject
to legal challenge for any irregularity in any step of the promulgation
process, as well as for conflict with other laws, or exceeding the
Congressional mandate of the statute itself."' Virtually every stage of the
process of the implementation mandated by Dodd-Frank has been held up
or challenged by the army of industry representatives who oppose
regulation.
Journalist Gary Rivlin, in an article called How Wall Street Defanged
Dodd-Frank , vividly captured the reality of the extent to which passage of
Dodd-Frank represents only the tip of the iceberg in terms of effectuating
any changes to the financial system.1 1 9 At 5:30 am on a Friday after the joint
House-Senate conference committee approved Dodd-Frank's final
language, Rivlin quotes the chief lobbyist for the Financial Services
Roundtable: ""Halftime,' shrugged Scott Talbott."1 2 0 Rivlin goes on to
report that the financial services industry significantly increased the amount
of money spent on lobbying after the enactment of Dodd-Frank, sending a
virtual army of lobbyists into the battle of the regulations that give content
to the law.121 Rivlin writes:
The story of how Wall Street lobbyists worked the halls of
Congress, blocking the appointment of Elizabeth Warren, Obama's
first choice to head the CFPB, or pushing bills aimed at defanging
Dodd-Frank, is fairly well-known by now. But it was the stealthy
work of battalions of regulatory lawyers, who descended on the
private offices of regulators deep inside the bureaucracy, that has
proven more crucial to the industry's effort to pick off pieces of
Dodd-Frank. There, a kind of ground war has been going on for
almost three years, with the regulators waging hand-to-hand combat
to defend every clause and comma in Dodd-Frank, and the lawyers
fighting to insert any loophole they can to protect their clients'
extraordinary profits. This is how the miracle that was the making
of Dodd-Frank-hailed as the most comprehensive financial reform
since the 1930s-became a slow-moving horror movie called "The
Unmaking of Dodd-Frank": a perfect case study of the ways an
industry with nearly unlimited resources can avoid a set of tough-
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minded reforms it doesn't like.122
Rivlin paints a picture of the hopelessly outnumbered lobbyists for the
consumers' interests (the article starts with a graphic depicting this: 20 little
guys with briefcases representing the lobbyists for the industry sent to
Capitol Hill to destroy Dodd-Frank in 2012, pitched against one lone guy
(without a briefcase) representing the lobbyists for the consumer).123
So, clearly, there is the possibility that pure brute force-in terms of
manpower and resources-could muffle the best intentions of anyone
hoping to use the new structures and powers of Dodd-Frank to keep the
interests of the consumer in the forefront of the response to the financial
crisis. But that brute force has some limits, because no lobbyist-influenced
regulatory response that completely defies the will of Congress as
expressed in the statute is ultimately defensible in court. The CFPB has
promulgated regulations implementing Dodd-Frank's restrictions on
steering and ability-to-pay requirements. Like it or not, the industry is going
to be subject to some measure of a "'duty to care"' responsibility, some
structural road bumps in the consumer lending process that force banks to
think about the particularhuman being to whom a mortgage loan is being
made, in the course of making that loan.
But it is clear that this is an ongoing battle-posing both an ongoing
opportunity for regulators to head the calls of the Popes, and an ongoing
opportunity for the industry to prevent them from doing so. One of the most
troublesome battlegrounds in the rule-making process is proving to be the
requirement that regulators conduct a cost-benefit analysis of proposed
regulations, and to justify the particular regulatory choices made by such an
analysis. This cost-benefit analysis requirement is a rather curious thing,
politically. It was initially introduced in an Executive Order issued by
President Reagan in 1981, requiring the Office of Management and Budget
to conduct a review of proposed new regulations focusing on a cost-benefit
analysis.124 President Clinton maintained this requirement,125 as did
President Obama.126
Clearly, the abstract principle of imposing a
requirement that regulatory agencies rigorously consider all of the possible
costs of a proposed regulation before proposing the regulation has
bipartisan support. Dodd-Frank specifically mandates that the CFPB, in its
rulemaking:
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Consider-(i) the potential benefits and costs to consumers and
covered persons, including the potential reduction of access by
consumers to consumer financial products or services resulting
from such rule; and (ii) the impact of proposed rules on covered
persons . . . and the impact on consumers in rural areas." 127
Whether such a cost benefit analysis requirement will impede the
ability of the CFPB to keep its focus on the consumer in the way that the
Popes advocate will depend on what sorts of factors are considered
legitimate factors in the conduct of such an analysis.
In a U.S. Chamber of Commerce Report defending a robust application
of a cost-benefit analysis, the authors invoke Benjamin Franklin in
defending cost-benefit analysis as, at its core, reflecting
... a venerable, conventional methodology and wisdom on rational
decision-making. As expressed, for example, in a 1772 letter that
Benjamin Franklin wrote to his friend Joseph Priestly, listing the
pros and cons of a solution on a piece of paper and carefully
weighting them against one another provides a practical method for
solving difficult problems. Franklin's "'prudential algebra"'
resonates today as common sense. Advanced econometric analysis
and the accumulated experience of diverse agencies applying costbenefit analysis for many years have improved this intuitive method
into a powerful tool for rational rulemaking.128
But the danger lies in the possibility that what is defined as a legitimate
factor in those lists of benefits and detriments comes to exclude anything
that is not capable of being quantified-that excludes, by definition,
consideration of the cost to the individual consumer at the end of a
consumer loan. And there are indications in some of the arguments being
made with respect to the role of cost-benefit analyses in Dodd-Frank
rulemaking that this could be happening.
Consider, for example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce report that I
just cited. In arguing for a more robust application of the cost-benefit
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justification of financial regulation, the authors dismiss any critiques of
cost-benefit analysis by, first of all, suggesting that the cost-benefit analysis
requirement is only designed to "provide a methodology to capture all the
costs that can be captured, enabling regulators to determine the best course
of action. Where costs cannot be quantified, the agency may include
qualitative evaluation that explains the virtues of a particular regulatory
actions."129 However, the Report then goes on to discuss in detail the trio of
decisions from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in which regulations
proposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission were held to have
failed to satisfy particular requirements for a valid cost-benefit analysis, all
of which tended to focus on inadequacies in the quantifiable items on Ben
Franklin's list.13 0 The non-quantifiable side of Ben Franklin's column
(where many of the costs to the consumer might be found) seems to be in
danger of getting short shrift.
The real danger here, lurking in the background of the issue of costbenefit analysis, is not, as Rivlin suggests, that the "'industry"' will
successfully use the courts to continue to thwart any regulation that might
impose the slightest cost on the industry, in the guise of this "'cost-benefit
analysis."' Rather, the real danger is much more subtle; it is' the same
danger that the Popes articulated, with which I began this article. The
danger is that the "'cost-benefit analysis"' will not be opened up to permit
factors that fall into the column of the human costs of the financial crisis,
the non-quantifiable costs, to balance some of the quantifiable financial
costs to the industry.
The authors of the Chamber of Commerce report explicitly reject the
validity of any moral or ethical critiques of cost-benefit analysis 3 1 with
these words:
whatever the value of [ethical or moral] arguments against the use
of cost-benefit analysis in the context of environmental, safety, or
other regulations, they rarely apply in the context of financial
regulation because financial regulation is less likely to implicate
thorny questions of placing a value on human life or comparing
129. Id. at 18 (citing Exec. Order 13,563, 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2011-12)).
130. Id. at 29-33 (citing Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Am.
Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Bus. Roundtable & U.S.
Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). ; But see Am. Petroleum Inst. v.
EPA, 684 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (suggesting some curbs on the court's review of agency
cost-benefit analyses).
131. Id. at 18 (citing Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.
J. 1981, 2049 (1998); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of CostBenefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1005 (2000); Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 931 (2000)).
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tangible economic costs with less tangible environmental costs,
such as the value of wildlife preserves or endangered species.
Instead, while there will still be debates about how to quantify
different costs and benefits, generally the costs and benefits at issue
in financial regulation are economic and thus quantifiable without
having to engage in valuing noneconomic costs or benefits.1 3 2
Besides demonstrating absurdly circular logic, the claim that the costs
and benefits at issue in financial regulation are always economic and thus
quantifiable, seems to me to have been rather soundly refuted by the
undeniable human toll of the global financial crisis. This is precisely why
Pope Francis exhorted political and financial leaders "to generous solidarity
and a return of economics and finance to an ethical approach which favors
human beings,"133 keeping in mind that "[t]he dignity of each human
person and the pursuit of the common good are concerns which ought to
shape all economic policies." 1 3 4
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